Privacy
What is stored about you when you vote, who can read it, how long it stays, and what is deleted when the election is over. Written as an inventory rather than a policy, because the question people actually ask is "what is held about me".
Two organisations, and only one of them is us
VOTUM is built and run by mirket.io. But the election you are voting in belongs to somebody else — your association, institution or committee — and they decide who may vote, what is asked, and what happens to the records afterwards. For anything about your own participation, they are the people to ask. We operate the servers.
What is stored
Everything below is per election. Nothing is shared between elections, and nothing is sold, rented or given to anyone outside the organisation running yours.
| Item | What exactly | Who can read it |
|---|---|---|
| Your entry on the roll | Name, organisation, country, e-mail address, and the language you were assigned. Supplied by the election administrator, not collected from you. | The election administrators |
| Your voting token | The token itself, and the fact that it was issued to you. This pairing is kept for the whole election so that a lost token can be replaced and so that the people who have not voted can be reminded. | The election administrators |
| Your ballot | Encrypted in your own browser before it is sent, and stored in that form. It carries a reference to your token, not your name. | Nobody, until the election is closed and the count is opened with the election key |
| Your tracking code | The code, the time the ballot arrived, and a fingerprint of the sealed ballot. Not stored against your name — this is why nobody can look your code up for you. | Anyone who has the code, which means you |
| Your IP address and browser | Never kept in readable form. What is stored is an HMAC fingerprint computed with a secret specific to your election, so the list cannot be turned back into addresses. It exists so that a claim of interference can be tested against a specific address, not so that anyone can be tracked. | Nobody can read it back; it can only be matched against an address somebody already has |
| The event log | Every administrative action, with the time and who did it. Each entry carries the hash of the one before it, so an entry cannot be altered or removed quietly. It records what administrators did, not what voters chose. | The election administrators, and any auditor they grant access to |
| Messages sent to you | That a message was sent to your address, when, and whether it was delivered. Not the tokens themselves. | The election administrators |
| Administrator accounts | Name, e-mail address, password hash, two-factor setup and sign-in times. This applies to people who run elections, not to voters. | System administrators |
The one thing you should know before you vote
Your ballot is encrypted on your own device, so nobody who intercepts it or copies the database can read it. That protection is arithmetic and it holds. But the organisation running the election holds the key that opens the ballots after closing, and it also holds the record of which token was issued to you. Somebody with direct access to the database could therefore work out how a named person voted. No screen offers this, every administrative action is logged, and doing it would be a serious breach — but it is prevented by conduct and access control, not by mathematics. We would rather write this down here than let you assume otherwise.
What is not stored
- No analytics, no tracking pixels, no advertising identifiers, and no third-party scripts of any kind. The pages load nothing from anywhere except this server.
- No raw IP addresses and no browser fingerprints in readable form.
- No record of which candidate you chose in readable form at any point before the count is opened.
- Nothing at all about people who are not on an election roll. Reading this page stores nothing about you.
How long it stays
An election has to stay checkable after it ends, and the people on its roll should not stay on file forever. Those two pull against each other, so the records are separated rather than kept or deleted as one block.
- While the election runs and through the dispute period that follows it, everything above is kept. Shortening this would mean a dispute could not be investigated.
- After the dispute period, the administrator can erase the identity side: names, organisations and e-mail addresses are deleted outright. The encrypted ballots, the tracking codes, the event log and the result stay, so the election remains verifiable by anyone holding a tracking code — but it no longer contains a list of who took part.
- Deleting an election removes everything belonging to it. This is refused once ballots have been cast, so that a result cannot be made to disappear by pressing a button.
Cookies
One cookie, and only after you enter a token or sign in: the session cookie that keeps you logged in for that visit. It carries an identifier and nothing else, it is not readable by scripts, and it is gone when you close the browser or sign out. There is no cookie banner because there is nothing to consent to.
Asking about your own data
Ask the administrator of the election you took part in: they hold the roll and they decide what happens to it. If you do not know who that is, or if you believe something has gone wrong with the system itself rather than with one election, write to mirket.io and we will route it. One request we cannot grant, for anybody: telling you how another person voted.