VOTUM
End-to-end verifiable

Sealed on your device. Counted where you can check it.

Online voting for associations and institutions. Every ballot is encrypted in the voter's own browser and stored sealed, so a copied database reveals nothing without the election key. Every voter gets a tracking code and can have their own ballot confirmed. The organisation running the election holds that key, and this site says exactly what that means.

Sealed

Your ballot is encrypted in your browser before it leaves your device, and the server stores it sealed. Anyone who copies the database without the election key reads nothing at all. That key belongs to the organisation running the election, so the secrecy of your ballot rests on who they are as well as on the encryption. We would rather be exact about that than let you assume more.

Recorded and countable

Every ballot is written to the bulletin board as it arrives, with a tracking code that reveals nothing about its content. Each voter can look their own code up and confirm the ballot was recorded, without signing in and without going through the administrator. The count is opened only after the box is sealed, and the sealing happens first so the order itself is on record.

Six steps, from setting up to settling a dispute

Nothing here needs a specialist. The parts that require care, freezing the roll before tokens go out and sealing the box before the result is opened, are the parts the software puts in the right order for you.

  1. Tokens go out

    You enter who may vote, or import the list from a spreadsheet. A token is created for each person straight away. From the Tokens screen you send them out, one at a time or to everyone who has not voted yet, and you can replace a token somebody has lost.

  2. People vote

    One tap from the e-mail opens the ballot paper. The choice is encrypted on their device, and they get a tracking code. If you allow it, they can come back and change their vote until voting closes; only the last one counts.

  3. Everyone can watch

    The administrator sees turnout as it happens, and which voters are still outstanding. Running totals appear nowhere, and the meeting screen stays blank until the result is published, so a partial count cannot steer the room.

  1. The box is sealed

    At closing, the ballot box gets a fingerprint that is published immediately, before any result is opened. That order is what makes the seal mean something.

  2. The result is opened

    Once the box is sealed, the administrator opens the count and reads it. Nobody else sees anything yet. When the room is ready they open the presentation, and the result appears on the meeting screen, which needs no sign-in. A screen already on the projector picks it up by itself.

  3. Anyone can recount

    Every action is written to a chained log, and the source fingerprint is frozen when the election is created. A disputed result is answered by showing records, not by explaining a procedure.

Three screens, and that is the whole thing

A voter needs about a minute and never leaves the page. The rules open in place, the ballot is sealed on their own device, and they are given a code that proves it was recorded.

The ballot
Step 1

The ballot

Candidates, one choice, and a plain statement that the ballot is encrypted on this device before it is sent.

The tracking code
Step 2

The tracking code

Given the moment the ballot is recorded. It proves the ballot is in the box and does not reveal how the person voted.

Confirming it was recorded
Step 3

Confirming it was recorded

The voter looks their own code up, without signing in and without asking anybody. If it is on the board, the ballot is in the box and will be counted.

Most online voting asks you to trust the operator. This one is built so that you do not have to — and says plainly where that stops.

Built around one idea: make interference visible

Encrypted on the device

The browser seals the ballot using its own built-in cryptography. No library is downloaded, none was written by us, and no readable vote ever reaches the server.

A frozen voter roll

The list of who may vote is locked and its fingerprint published before a single token is issued. Done in that order it answers "names were added later"; done afterwards it would prove nothing.

A sealed ballot box

Closing publishes a fingerprint covering every ballot. Swap a ballot afterwards and the fingerprint no longer matches the one already published.

A log that cannot be edited quietly

Every action is chained to the one before it. Change an entry and every later hash breaks — including in copies other people already hold.

One screen for the voter

A voter sees the ballot paper and nothing else. The rules open in place, without leaving the page. Fewer places to get lost, fewer places to go wrong.

A tracking code for every ballot

Issued the moment a ballot is recorded. It reveals nothing about the choice, so a voter can keep it and show it, and a disputed ballot can be found by that code alone.

Any language

You choose which languages an election offers; each voter picks their own. Adding one is copying a folder and translating the values — no code changes.

Mapped against the standards

Council of Europe CM/Rec(2017)5 and OWASP ASVS, article by article — including the ones we only partly meet, which are listed rather than left out.

Open to audit

The source fingerprint is published with each election and fixed from then on. Anyone with the code can confirm the software did not change while voting was open.

Everything an organiser needs, and nothing that breaks the promise

The console runs the election: candidates, the voter roll, tokens, closing, the result. The only address anyone outside the administration can open is the meeting screen, and it shows nothing at all while voting is running.

Everything an organiser needs, and nothing that breaks the promise
The overview screen of an election in progress.

What this system cannot do

Any voting system that claims to solve everything is either misunderstood by the people selling it or is being sold dishonestly. These limits are properties of the design. They are stated here, on the sales page, because an election committee deserves to hear them before signing rather than during a dispute.

Stated up front

  • The organisation running the election holds the key that opens the ballots, and the system also records which token was issued to which voter. Together those two facts mean that somebody with direct database access could work out how a named person voted. Ballots are still encrypted on the device and sealed at rest, so a stolen database without the key reveals nothing, and every administrator action is logged. But this is a guarantee about access control, not about mathematics, and you should choose your operator on that basis.
  • The administrator issues and sends the tokens, and the Tokens screen shows which token belongs to which voter. That is what lets them chase the people who have not voted and replace a lost token, and it is also what makes the paragraph above true. Pick someone the electorate accepts, keep them separate from the people counting, and write the arrangement into the election rules.
  • With few voters, a unanimous or near-unanimous result reveals how individuals voted. That is arithmetic. No voting method can prevent it, and it belongs in your election rules.
  • Voting needs JavaScript and a current browser over HTTPS, because the ballot is encrypted on the device. There is no way to do that and also support browsers that cannot.

Running an election this year?

Tell us the shape of it — how many voters, what has to be decided, what your statutes require — and we will tell you honestly whether this fits.

Are you sure?